Young Widow(er)s, Social Security, and Marriage

by
ORES Working Paper No. 103 (released March 2004)

Michael J. Brien is with Deloitte & Touche LLP. Stacy Dickert-Conlin is with Syracuse University. David A. Weaver is with the Division of Economic Research, Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics, Office of Policy, Social Security Administration.

Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Ben Bridges, Joyce Manchester, Sheila B. Kamerman, and participants at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America for helpful comments. The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration funded as part of the Retirement Research Consortium.

Working papers in this series are preliminary materials circulated for review and comment. The findings and conclusions expressed in them are the authors' and do not necessarily represent the views of the Social Security Administration.

Summary

Upon a worker's death, Social Security pays benefits to each minor or disabled child and to the worker's widow(er), provided a child of the worker is in his or her care. Although remarriage has no effect on a child's eligibility for benefits, the benefit going directly to the widow(er) terminates if he or she remarries. One policy rationale for the marriage termination provision is to ensure a well-targeted and less expensive Social Security program. That is, a widow(er) who remarries has access to his or her new spouse's income and is in less need of support from a public program. On the other hand, the termination provision may affect marriage decisions, with some widow(er)s not remarrying and others postponing marriage.

In the income tax literature, when a couple faces a higher (lower) tax bill as a married couple than as two single individuals, it is said that the couple, in effect, faces a marriage penalty (marriage subsidy). We use this terminology for this paper; the amount of Social Security that would be lost if a widow(er) remarries is referred to as the "marriage penalty." We show that the dollar amount of the penalty depends on the primary insurance amount of the deceased worker, the number of children in the family, and the widow(er)'s earnings. The median penalty faced by widow(er)s receiving benefits in 2001 is found to be large (around $4,100 per year). However, the penalty varies substantially across widow(er)s. While more than 20 percent of widow(er)s face no penalty, 10 percent face an annual penalty in excess of $10,920 per year.

We review several studies from the income tax literature and conclude that the Social Security marriage penalties are large relative to penalty amounts found in that literature. In addition, we note that studies have found that the tax code has small but statistically significant effects on marriage decisions; it is possible, therefore, that Social Security marriage penalties, given their size, also affect some marriage decisions. However, a complete analysis of marriage, which would consider a large set of financial, sociological, and demographic variables, is beyond the scope of this paper.

The focus of this paper is on describing and measuring marriage penalties faced by widow(er)s caring for children. Specific options to remove or modify the current law provision that terminates benefits upon remarriage are not addressed here. Such options, which would increase program expenditures, would have to be considered in the broader context of the solvency of the overall Social Security system. Finally, this paper does not address the equity issues that inevitably arise when considering program rules involving marriage.

Introduction

Although there has been a recent policy focus on marriage penalties in the income tax system, researchers have also documented penalties associated with other government policies. Historically, for example, a large literature developed focusing on the marriage penalties in the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.1 Concerns over how marriage penalties might affect the well-being and development of children motivated this literature. Despite concerns regarding the well-being of children, researchers have virtually ignored marriage penalties in the Social Security program for families with widow(er)s caring for minor or disabled children.2 Social Security pays benefits to each minor or disabled child and to the worker's widow(er) provided a child of the worker is in his or her care. Although remarriage has no effect on a child's eligibility for benefits, the benefit going directly to the widow(er) terminates if he or she remarries. We find that the median marriage penalty faced by widow(er)s is large (around $4,100 per year).

The child-in-care program affects a sizable number of survivors. At the start of 2001, there were 240,000 persons entitled to child-in-care widow(er) benefits, with over 400,000 children in their care. There is a substantial amount of turnover in the entitled population, such that during the 5-year period 1996 through 2000, about 500,000 widow(er)s were entitled at some point to benefits on the accounts of deceased workers. These 500,000 widow(er)s cared for a substantial number of children—more than a million children had established entitlement to benefits on these accounts by the end of 2000.3

Unlike private insurance, social insurance systems such as the U.S. Social Security program often have provisions that limit or stop payments based on beneficiaries' ability to support themselves. Widow(er)s who remarry presumably receive economic support from their new spouses and are in less need of support from a public program. In this regard, the termination provision is similar to another feature of Social Security, namely, the earnings test. Widow(er)s (and other beneficiaries) who are under the full retirement age and who earn above exempt amounts specified in the law have some or all of their Social Security benefits stopped.4 Provisions such as the termination rule and the earnings test help ensure a well-targeted Social Security program, but they may have the unintended consequence of distorting marriage and work decisions.5

Overall, our work focuses on describing and measuring the marriage penalties associated with the termination provision. We do not address equity issues (that is, should married persons with deceased spouses receive Social Security while other married persons do not), nor do we address the overall treatment of marriage by the Social Security program.6 In addition, we do not offer specific options to modify or eliminate the termination provision. Such options would increase program expenditures and would have to be evaluated in the larger context of Social Security's long-run solvency.7

Institutional Details: Marriage Penalties in the Child-in-Care Program

Social Security calculates benefits based on primary insurance amounts (PIAs)—a figure based on a worker's average lifetime monthly earnings in Social Security-covered employment. A person's PIA increases with earnings, but the PIA formula favors low earners. A widow(er) caring for a deceased worker's child who is under age 16 or disabled is eligible for a monthly benefit potentially equal to 75 percent of the deceased worker's PIA. Each child who is under age 18, disabled, or aged 18 to 19 and attending high school is also eligible for a benefit potentially equal to 75 percent of PIA. The widow(er)'s eligibility ends when he or she remarries or when the youngest child reaches age 16, whichever comes first. However, the children's benefits continue as long as they are categorically eligible.

Although each survivor is potentially eligible for 75 percent of PIA, two provisions of Social Security—the family maximum and the earnings test—can reduce this amount. Thus, the monthly marriage penalty faced by a child-in-care widow(er) is not necessarily equal to 75 percent of the PIA.8

The family maximum of Social Security limits the total amount that can be paid on a given worker's record and is a function of the worker's PIA. To illustrate this provision, consider a worker who died in 2001. Monthly family benefits to the widow(er) and children in that year cannot exceed:

  1. 150 percent of the first $717 of the worker's PIA, plus
  2. 272 percent of the worker's PIA over $717 through $1,034, plus
  3. 134 percent of the worker's PIA over $1,034 through $1,349, plus
  4. 175 percent of the worker's PIA over $1,349.

Social Security determines the initial maximum in the year the worker dies or, if it is earlier, the year the worker is first eligible for Social Security benefits (that is, age 62 or disabled). From the date it is determined, Social Security annually adjusts the maximum and the PIA for inflation. The dollar bend points of the formula used to determine the initial family maximum benefit adjust each year for wage growth in the economy.9 The family maximum is never below 150 percent of PIA and is never above 187.5 percent of PIA.10

To see how the family maximum affects marriage penalties, consider a family of three (a widow(er) and two children) whose maximum is 187.5 percent of PIA. Although each family member's original benefit amount is 75 percent of PIA, the family maximum will allow each member to be paid only 62.5 percent of PIA (for a total of 187.5 percent). If the widow(er) remarries, his or her benefit stops but the two children then receive their full original benefit amounts of 75 percent of PIA. The family's total benefit following remarriage would be 150 percent of PIA. The actual monthly marriage penalty to the family, therefore, is 37.5 (that is, 187.5 − 150) percent of PIA.

We calculate the penalty at the family level for two reasons. First, the widow(er) probably controls the family's Social Security payments regardless of whether he or she receives a benefit himself or herself. Second, measures of economic well-being, such as the U.S. poverty measure, are typically based on family income.11

In general, we write the monthly marriage penalty as the difference between the family benefits when the widow(er) and the children are eligible, BU, and the family benefits when only the children are eligible, BM:

(1) B U = MIN [ ( N + 1 ) * 0.75 * PIA ,   FMAX ] ,
(2) B M = MIN [ N * 0.75 * PIA ,   FMAX ] ,
(3) PENALTY = B U B M ,

where N denotes the number of children and FMAX is the family maximum that applies. The formula indicates that, in addition to PIA, the number of children present is a major determinant of the penalty size. Chart 1 depicts this relationship in monthly dollars for 2001. When only one child is present, BU is 150 percent of PIA and BM is 75 percent of PIA. Since the family maximum is never below 150 percent of PIA, it is not a factor in the penalty calculation in this case, and, consequently, the monthly penalty is always 75 percent of PIA. When three or more children are present, the family maximum binds regardless of whether the widow(er) receives benefits, that is, BU and BM both equal the family maximum. Therefore, the penalty is always zero when three or more children are present. When two children are present, the penalty depends on the PIA. One interesting result in the case of two children is that if the PIA is low (that is, below the first bend point in the family maximum formula), the marriage penalty is zero because whether the widow(er) is eligible or not the family benefit will be 150 percent of PIA. In general, the family maximum provisions cause the dollar value of the monthly marriage penalty to be negatively related to the number of children and positively related to the size of the PIA.

Chart 1.
Actual marriage penalties for families of workers who died in 2001 and had one, two, or three children
Line chart with tabular format below.
Show as table
Table equivalent for Chart 1. Actual marriage penalties for families of workers who died in 2001 and had one, two, or three children (dollars per month)
2001 PIA
(dollars per month)
1 child 2 children 3 children
1 1 0 0
2 2 0 0
3 2 0 0
4 3 0 0
5 4 0 0
6 5 0 0
7 5 0 0
8 6 0 0
9 7 0 0
10 8 0 0
11 8 0 0
12 9 0 0
13 10 0 0
14 11 0 0
15 11 0 0
16 12 0 0
17 13 0 0
18 14 0 0
19 14 0 0
20 15 0 0
21 16 0 0
22 17 0 0
23 17 0 0
24 18 0 0
25 19 0 0
26 20 0 0
27 20 0 0
28 21 0 0
29 22 0 0
30 23 0 0
31 23 0 0
32 24 0 0
33 25 0 0
34 26 0 0
35 26 0 0
36 27 0 0
37 28 0 0
38 29 0 0
39 29 0 0
40 30 0 0
41 31 0 0
42 32 0 0
43 32 0 0
44 33 0 0
45 34 0 0
46 35 0 0
47 35 0 0
48 36 0 0
49 37 0 0
50 38 0 0
51 38 0 0
52 39 0 0
53 40 0 0
54 41 0 0
55 41 0 0
56 42 0 0
57 43 0 0
58 44 0 0
59 44 0 0
60 45 0 0
61 46 0 0
62 47 0 0
63 47 0 0
64 48 0 0
65 49 0 0
66 50 0 0
67 50 0 0
68 51 0 0
69 52 0 0
70 53 0 0
71 53 0 0
72 54 0 0
73 55 0 0
74 56 0 0
75 56 0 0
76 57 0 0
77 58 0 0
78 59 0 0
79 59 0 0
80 60 0 0
81 61 0 0
82 62 0 0
83 62 0 0
84 63 0 0
85 64 0 0
86 65 0 0
87 65 0 0
88 66 0 0
89 67 0 0
90 68 0 0
91 68 0 0
92 69 0 0
93 70 0 0
94 71 0 0
95 71 0 0
96 72 0 0
97 73 0 0
98 74 0 0
99 74 0 0
100 75 0 0
101 76 0 0
102 77 0 0
103 77 0 0
104 78 0 0
105 79 0 0
106 80 0 0
107 80 0 0
108 81 0 0
109 82 0 0
110 83 0 0
111 83 0 0
112 84 0 0
113 85 0 0
114 86 0 0
115 86 0 0
116 87 0 0
117 88 0 0
118 89 0 0
119 89 0 0
120 90 0 0
121 91 0 0
122 92 0 0
123 92 0 0
124 93 0 0
125 94 0 0
126 95 0 0
127 95 0 0
128 96 0 0
129 97 0 0
130 98 0 0
131 98 0 0
132 99 0 0
133 100 0 0
134 101 0 0
135 101 0 0
136 102 0 0
137 103 0 0
138 104 0 0
139 104 0 0
140 105 0 0
141 106 0 0
142 107 0 0
143 107 0 0
144 108 0 0
145 109 0 0
146 110 0 0
147 110 0 0
148 111 0 0
149 112 0 0
150 113 0 0
151 113 0 0
152 114 0 0
153 115 0 0
154 116 0 0
155 116 0 0
156 117 0 0
157 118 0 0
158 119 0 0
159 119 0 0
160 120 0 0
161 121 0 0
162 122 0 0
163 122 0 0
164 123 0 0
165 124 0 0
166 125 0 0
167 125 0 0
168 126 0 0
169 127 0 0
170 128 0 0
171 128 0 0
172 129 0 0
173 130 0 0
174 131 0 0
175 131 0 0
176 132 0 0
177 133 0 0
178 134 0 0
179 134 0 0
180 135 0 0
181 136 0 0
182 137 0 0
183 137 0 0
184 138 0 0
185 139 0 0
186 140 0 0
187 140 0 0
188 141 0 0
189 142 0 0
190 143 0 0
191 143 0 0
192 144 0 0
193 145 0 0
194 146 0 0
195 146 0 0
196 147 0 0
197 148 0 0
198 149 0 0
199 149 0 0
200 150 0 0
201 151 0 0
202 152 0 0
203 152 0 0
204 153 0 0
205 154 0 0
206 155 0 0
207 155 0 0
208 156 0 0
209 157 0 0
210 158 0 0
211 158 0 0
212 159 0 0
213 160 0 0
214 161 0 0
215 161 0 0
216 162 0 0
217 163 0 0
218 164 0 0
219 164 0 0
220 165 0 0
221 166 0 0
222 167 0 0
223 167 0 0
224 168 0 0
225 169 0 0
226 170 0 0
227 170 0 0
228 171 0 0
229 172 0 0
230 173 0 0
231 173 0 0
232 174 0 0
233 175 0 0
234 176 0 0
235 176 0 0
236 177 0 0
237 178 0 0
238 179 0 0
239 179 0 0
240 180 0 0
241 181 0 0
242 182 0 0
243 182 0 0
244 183 0 0
245 184 0 0
246 185 0 0
247 185 0 0
248 186 0 0
249 187 0 0
250 188 0 0
251 188 0 0
252 189 0 0
253 190 0 0
254 191 0 0
255 191 0 0
256 192 0 0
257 193 0 0
258 194 0 0
259 194 0 0
260 195 0 0
261 196 0 0
262 197 0 0
263 197 0 0
264 198 0 0
265 199 0 0
266 200 0 0
267 200 0 0
268 201 0 0
269 202 0 0
270 203 0 0
271 203 0 0
272 204 0 0
273 205 0 0
274 206 0 0
275 206 0 0
276 207 0 0
277 208 0 0
278 209 0 0
279 209 0 0
280 210 0 0
281 211 0 0
282 212 0 0
283 212 0 0
284 213 0 0
285 214 0 0
286 215 0 0
287 215 0 0
288 216 0 0
289 217 0 0
290 218 0 0
291 218 0 0
292 219 0 0
293 220 0 0
294 221 0 0
295 221 0 0
296 222 0 0
297 223 0 0
298 224 0 0
299 224 0 0
300 225 0 0
301 226 0 0
302 227 0 0
303 227 0 0
304 228 0 0
305 229 0 0
306 230 0 0
307 230 0 0
308 231 0 0
309 232 0 0
310 233 0 0
311 233 0 0
312 234 0 0
313 235 0 0
314 236 0 0
315 236 0 0
316 237 0 0
317 238 0 0
318 239 0 0
319 239 0 0
320 240 0 0
321 241 0 0
322 242 0 0
323 242 0 0
324 243 0 0
325 244 0 0
326 245 0 0
327 245 0 0
328 246 0 0
329 247 0 0
330 248 0 0
331 248 0 0
332 249 0 0
333 250 0 0
334 251 0 0
335 251 0 0
336 252 0 0
337 253 0 0
338 254 0 0
339 254 0 0
340 255 0 0
341 256 0 0
342 257 0 0
343 257 0 0
344 258 0 0
345 259 0 0
346 260 0 0
347 260 0 0
348 261 0 0
349 262 0 0
350 263 0 0
351 263 0 0
352 264 0 0
353 265 0 0
354 266 0 0
355 266 0 0
356 267 0 0
357 268 0 0
358 269 0 0
359 269 0 0
360 270 0 0
361 271 0 0
362 272 0 0
363 272 0 0
364 273 0 0
365 274 0 0
366 275 0 0
367 275 0 0
368 276 0 0
369 277 0 0
370 278 0 0
371 278 0 0
372 279 0 0
373 280 0 0
374 281 0 0
375 281 0 0
376 282 0 0
377 283 0 0
378 284 0 0
379 284 0 0
380 285 0 0
381 286 0 0
382 287 0 0
383 287 0 0
384 288 0 0
385 289 0 0
386 290 0 0
387 290 0 0
388 291 0 0
389 292 0 0
390 293 0 0
391 293 0 0
392 294 0 0
393 295 0 0
394 296 0 0
395 296 0 0
396 297 0 0
397 298 0 0
398 299 0 0
399 299 0 0
400 300 0 0
401 301 0 0
402 302 0 0
403 302 0 0
404 303 0 0
405 304 0 0
406 305 0 0
407 305 0 0
408 306 0 0
409 307 0 0
410 308 0 0
411 308 0 0
412 309 0 0
413 310 0 0
414 311 0 0
415 311 0 0
416 312 0 0
417 313 0 0
418 314 0 0
419 314 0 0
420 315 0 0
421 316 0 0
422 317 0 0
423 317 0 0
424 318 0 0
425 319 0 0
426 320 0 0
427 320 0 0
428 321 0 0
429 322 0 0
430 323 0 0
431 323 0 0
432 324 0 0
433 325 0 0
434 326 0 0
435 326 0 0
436 327 0 0
437 328 0 0
438 329 0 0
439 329 0 0
440 330 0 0
441 331 0 0
442 332 0 0
443 332 0 0
444 333 0 0
445 334 0 0
446 335 0 0
447 335 0 0
448 336 0 0
449 337 0 0
450 338 0 0
451 338 0 0
452 339 0 0
453 340 0 0
454 341 0 0
455 341 0 0
456 342 0 0
457 343 0 0
458 344 0 0
459 344 0 0
460 345 0 0
461 346 0 0
462 347 0 0
463 347 0 0
464 348 0 0
465 349 0 0
466 350 0 0
467 350 0 0
468 351 0 0
469 352 0 0
470 353 0 0
471 353 0 0
472 354 0 0
473 355 0 0
474 356 0 0
475 356 0 0
476 357 0 0
477 358 0 0
478 359 0 0
479 359 0 0
480 360 0 0
481 361 0 0
482 362 0 0
483 362 0 0
484 363 0 0
485 364 0 0
486 365 0 0
487 365 0 0
488 366 0 0
489 367 0 0
490 368 0 0
491 368 0 0
492 369 0 0
493 370 0 0
494 371 0 0
495 371 0 0
496 372 0 0
497 373 0 0
498 374 0 0
499 374 0 0
500 375 0 0
501 376 0 0
502 377 0 0
503 377 0 0
504 378 0 0
505 379 0 0
506 380 0 0
507 380 0 0
508 381 0 0
509 382 0 0
510 383 0 0
511 383 0 0
512 384 0 0
513 385 0 0
514 386 0 0
515 386 0 0
516 387 0 0
517 388 0 0
518 389 0 0
519 389 0 0
520 390 0 0
521 391 0 0
522 392 0 0
523 392 0 0
524 393 0 0
525 394 0 0
526 395 0 0
527 395 0 0
528 396 0 0
529 397 0 0
530 398 0 0
531 398 0 0
532 399 0 0
533 400 0 0
534 401 0 0
535 401 0 0
536 402 0 0
537 403 0 0
538 404 0 0
539 404 0 0
540 405 0 0
541 406 0 0
542 407 0 0
543 407 0 0
544 408 0 0
545 409 0 0
546 410 0 0
547 410 0 0
548 411 0 0
549 412 0 0
550 413 0 0
551 413 0 0
552 414 0 0
553 415 0 0
554 416 0 0
555 416 0 0
556 417 0 0
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558 419 0 0
559 419 0 0
560 420 0 0
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562 422 0 0
563 422 0 0
564 423 0 0
565 424 0 0
566 425 0 0
567 425 0 0
568 426 0 0
569 427 0 0
570 428 0 0
571 428 0 0
572 429 0 0
573 430 0 0
574 431 0 0
575 431 0 0
576 432 0 0
577 433 0 0
578 434 0 0
579 434 0 0
580 435 0 0
581 436 0 0
582 437 0 0
583 437 0 0
584 438 0 0
585 439 0 0
586 440 0 0
587 440 0 0
588 441 0 0
589 442 0 0
590 443 0 0
591 443 0 0
592 444 0 0
593 445 0 0
594 446 0 0
595 446 0 0
596 447 0 0
597 448 0 0
598 449 0 0
599 449 0 0
600 450 0 0
601 451 0 0
602 452 0 0
603 452 0 0
604 453 0 0
605 454 0 0
606 455 0 0
607 455 0 0
608 456 0 0
609 457 0 0
610 458 0 0
611 458 0 0
612 459 0 0
613 460 0 0
614 461 0 0
615 461 0 0
616 462 0 0
617 463 0 0
618 464 0 0
619 464 0 0
620 465 0 0
621 466 0 0
622 467 0 0
623 467 0 0
624 468 0 0
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627 470 0 0
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629 472 0 0
630 473 0 0
631 473 0 0
632 474 0 0
633 475 0 0
634 476 0 0
635 476 0 0
636 477 0 0
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638 479 0 0
639 479 0 0
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650 488 0 0
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655 491 0 0
656 492 0 0
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658 494 0 0
659 494 0 0
660 495 0 0
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663 497 0 0
664 498 0 0
665 499 0 0
666 500 0 0
667 500 0 0
668 501 0 0
669 502 0 0
670 503 0 0
671 503 0 0
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684 513 0 0
685 514 0 0
686 515 0 0
687 515 0 0
688 516 0 0
689 517 0 0
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693 520 0 0
694 521 0 0
695 521 0 0
696 522 0 0
697 523 0 0
698 524 0 0
699 524 0 0
700 525 0 0
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702 527 0 0
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712 534 0 0
713 535 0 0
714 536 0 0
715 536 0 0
716 537 0 0
717 538 0 0
718 539 1 0
719 539 2 0
720 540 4 0
721 541 5 0
722 542 6 0
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724 543 9 0
725 544 10 0
726 545 11 0
727 545 12 0
728 546 13 0
729 547 15 0
730 548 16 0
731 548 17 0
732 549 18 0
733 550 20 0
734 551 21 0
735 551 22 0
736 552 23 0
737 553 24 0
738 554 26 0
739 554 27 0
740 555 28 0
741 556 29 0
742 557 31 0
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744 558 33 0
745 559 34 0
746 560 35 0
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750 563 40 0
751 563 41 0
752 564 43 0
753 565 44 0
754 566 45 0
755 566 46 0
756 567 48 0
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758 569 50 0
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761 571 54 0
762 572 55 0
763 572 56 0
764 573 57 0
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770 578 65 0
771 578 66 0
772 579 67 0
773 580 68 0
774 581 70 0
775 581 71 0
776 582 72 0
777 583 73 0
778 584 74 0
779 584 76 0
780 585 77 0
781 586 78 0
782 587 79 0
783 587 81 0
784 588 82 0
785 589 83 0
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788 591 87 0
789 592 88 0
790 593 89 0
791 593 90 0
792 594 92 0
793 595 93 0
794 596 94 0
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796 597 96 0
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800 600 101 0
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804 603 106 0
805 604 107 0
806 605 109 0
807 605 110 0
808 606 111 0
809 607 112 0
810 608 113 0
811 608 115 0
812 609 116 0
813 610 117 0
814 611 118 0
815 611 120 0
816 612 121 0
817 613 122 0
818 614 123 0
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820 615 126 0
821 616 127 0
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825 619 132 0
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830 623 138 0
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832 624 140 0
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838 629 148 0
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864 648 179 0
865 649 181 0
866 650 182 0
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877 658 195 0
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881 661 200 0
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883 662 203 0
884 663 204 0
885 664 205 0
886 665 206 0
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888 666 209 0
889 667 210 0
890 668 211 0
891 668 212 0
892 669 214 0
893 670 215 0
894 671 216 0
895 671 217 0
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1,772 1,329 442 0
1,773 1,330 442 0
1,774 1,331 443 0
1,775 1,331 443 0
1,776 1,332 443 0
1,777 1,333 443 0
1,778 1,334 444 0
1,779 1,334 444 0
1,780 1,335 444 0
1,781 1,336 444 0
1,782 1,337 445 0
1,783 1,337 445 0
1,784 1,338 445 0
1,785 1,339 445 0
1,786 1,340 446 0
1,787 1,340 446 0
1,788 1,341 446 0
1,789 1,342 446 0
1,790 1,343 447 0
1,791 1,343 447 0
1,792 1,344 447 0
1,793 1,345 447 0
1,794 1,346 448 0
1,795 1,346 448 0
1,796 1,347 448 0
1,797 1,348 448 0
1,798 1,349 449 0
1,799 1,349 449 0
1,800 1,350 449 0
1,801 1,351 449 0
1,802 1,352 450 0
1,803 1,352 450 0
1,804 1,353 450 0
1,805 1,354 450 0
1,806 1,355 451 0
1,807 1,355 451 0
1,808 1,356 451 0
1,809 1,357 451 0
1,810 1,358 452 0
1,811 1,358 452 0
1,812 1,359 452 0
1,813 1,360 452 0
1,814 1,361 453 0
1,815 1,361 453 0
1,816 1,362 453 0
1,817 1,363 453 0
1,818 1,364 454 0
1,819 1,364 454 0
1,820 1,365 454 0
1,821 1,366 454 0
1,822 1,367 455 0
1,823 1,367 455 0
1,824 1,368 455 0
1,825 1,369 455 0
1,826 1,370 456 0
1,827 1,370 456 0
1,828 1,371 456 0
1,829 1,372 456 0
1,830 1,373 457 0
1,831 1,373 457 0
1,832 1,374 457 0
1,833 1,375 457 0
1,834 1,376 458 0
1,835 1,376 458 0
1,836 1,377 458 0
1,837 1,378 458 0
1,838 1,379 459 0
1,839 1,379 459 0
1,840 1,380 459 0
1,841 1,381 459 0
1,842 1,382 460 0
1,843 1,382 460 0
1,844 1,383 460 0
1,845 1,384 460 0
1,846 1,385 461 0
1,847 1,385 461 0
1,848 1,386 461 0
1,849 1,387 461 0
1,850 1,388 462 0
1,851 1,388 462 0
1,852 1,389 462 0
1,853 1,390 462 0
1,854 1,391 463 0
1,855 1,391 463 0
1,856 1,392 463 0
1,857 1,393 463 0
1,858 1,394 464 0
1,859 1,394 464 0
1,860 1,395 464 0
1,861 1,396 464 0
1,862 1,397 465 0
1,863 1,397 465 0
1,864 1,398 465 0
1,865 1,399 465 0
1,866 1,400 466 0
1,867 1,400 466 0
1,868 1,401 466 0
1,869 1,402 466 0
1,870 1,403 467 0
1,871 1,403 467 0
1,872 1,404 467 0
1,873 1,405 467 0
1,874 1,406 468 0
1,875 1,406 468 0
1,876 1,407 468 0
1,877 1,408 468 0
1,878 1,409 469 0
1,879 1,409 469 0
1,880 1,410 469 0
1,881 1,411 469 0
1,882 1,412 470 0
1,883 1,412 470 0
1,884 1,413 470 0
1,885 1,414 470 0
1,886 1,415 471 0
1,887 1,415 471 0
1,888 1,416 471 0
1,889 1,417 471 0
1,890 1,418 472 0
1,891 1,418 472 0
1,892 1,419 472 0
1,893 1,420 472 0
1,894 1,421 473 0
1,895 1,421 473 0
1,896 1,422 473 0
1,897 1,423 473 0
1,898 1,424 474 0
1,899 1,424 474 0
1,900 1,425 474 0
1,901 1,426 474 0
1,902 1,427 475 0
1,903 1,427 475 0
1,904 1,428 475 0
1,905 1,429 475 0
1,906 1,430 476 0
1,907 1,430 476 0
1,908 1,431 476 0
1,909 1,432 476 0
1,910 1,433 477 0
1,911 1,433 477 0
1,912 1,434 477 0
1,913 1,435 477 0
1,914 1,436 478 0
1,915 1,436 478 0
1,916 1,437 478 0
1,917 1,438 478 0
1,918 1,439 479 0
1,919 1,439 479 0
1,920 1,440 479 0
1,921 1,441 479 0
1,922 1,442 480 0
1,923 1,442 480 0
1,924 1,443 480 0
1,925 1,444 480 0
1,926 1,445 481 0
1,927 1,445 481 0
1,928 1,446 481 0
1,929 1,447 481 0
1,930 1,448 482 0
1,931 1,448 482 0
1,932 1,449 482 0
1,933 1,450 482 0
1,934 1,451 483 0
1,935 1,451 483 0
1,936 1,452 483 0
1,937 1,453 483 0
1,938 1,454 484 0
1,939 1,454 484 0
1,940 1,455 484 0
1,941 1,456 484 0
1,942 1,457 485 0
1,943 1,457 485 0
1,944 1,458 485 0
1,945 1,459 485 0
1,946 1,460 486 0
1,947 1,460 486 0
1,948 1,461 486 0
1,949 1,462 486 0
1,950 1,463 487 0
1,951 1,463 487 0
1,952 1,464 487 0
1,953 1,465 487 0
1,954 1,466 488 0
1,955 1,466 488 0
1,956 1,467 488 0
1,957 1,468 488 0
1,958 1,469 489 0
1,959 1,469 489 0
1,960 1,470 489 0
1,961 1,471 489 0
1,962 1,472 490 0
1,963 1,472 490 0
1,964 1,473 490 0
1,965 1,474 490 0
1,966 1,475 491 0
1,967 1,475 491 0
1,968 1,476 491 0
1,969 1,477 491 0
1,970 1,478 492 0
1,971 1,478 492 0
1,972 1,479 492 0
1,973 1,480 492 0
1,974 1,481 493 0
1,975 1,481 493 0
1,976 1,482 493 0
1,977 1,483 493 0
1,978 1,484 494 0
1,979 1,484 494 0
1,980 1,485 494 0
1,981 1,486 494 0
1,982 1,487 495 0
1,983 1,487 495 0
1,984 1,488 495 0
1,985 1,489 495 0
1,986 1,490 496 0
1,987 1,490 496 0
1,988 1,491 496 0
1,989 1,492 496 0
1,990 1,493 497 0
1,991 1,493 497 0
1,992 1,494 497 0
1,993 1,495 497 0
1,994 1,496 498 0
1,995 1,496 498 0
1,996 1,497 498 0
1,997 1,498 498 0
1,998 1,499 499 0
1,999 1,499 499 0
2,000 1,500 499 0
 
SOURCE: Author's calculations using figures from U.S. Social Security Administration (2001a).
NOTE: PIA = primary insurance amount.

As noted above, the earnings test of Social Security also affects the marriage penalty a widow(er) faces. In 2001 the earnings test requires that, for each two dollars of annual earnings above $10,680, a widow(er) loses one dollar of his or her Social Security benefit (the $10,680 figure is referred to as the exempt amount and is adjusted annually by the Social Security Administration (SSA) based on wage growth in the economy). To see how the earnings test affects marriage penalties, consider a specific example: a family composed of a widow(er) and two children for whom the PIA is $1,034 and the family maximum is $1,938. If the widow(er) had no earnings, each family member would receive 62.5 percent of the PIA, which is the family maximum divided by three, or $646. Now suppose the widow(er) earns $18,432 in 2001.12 This is $7,752 above the exempt amount of $10,680 and the widow(er)'s Social Security must be reduced by $3,876 (that is, 7,752 * 0.5). This is equal to exactly 6 months of Social Security benefits, so SSA would not pay the widow(er) his or her $646 benefit for the first 6 months of the year. Because the widow(er) does not receive a benefit, the family maximum does not bind and the children, in those 6 months, would get their full 75 percent of PIA. So, for the first 6 months, the family receives 150 percent of the PIA ($1,551 a month). Starting with the 7th month, each family member—including the widow(er)—receives $646 (for a total of $1,938). If the widow(er) had remarried, the family would receive $1,551 for all months, implying that the marriage penalty is zero in the first 6 months and $387 ($1,938 − $1,551) in the final 6 months. Note that, in this example, if the widow(er) had earnings greater than $26,184, the earnings test would have prevented payment of widow(er) benefits for all months in 2001 and no marriage penalty would exist for that year.

In sum, the monthly marriage penalty faced by a widow(er) depends on the number of children, the PIA, and his or her earnings. The lifetime penalty depends, additionally, on the ages of the children, particularly the age of the youngest child. Child-in-care widow(er) benefits typically terminate when the youngest child reaches age 16. Widow(er)s with very young children who remarry forfeit benefits for a number of years.

Calculating Marriage Penalties in the Child-in-Care Program

To characterize the size of the marriage penalties faced by actual recipients of the child-in-care program and how these penalties vary by recipient characteristics, we use a weighted 10 percent sample of SSA's administrative records.13 As with estimates of marriage penalties in other contexts, we stress that these penalties arise from changes in Social Security benefits simply because of a change in legal marital status and that we are ignoring all other costs and benefits of marriage.

We estimate that, at the start of 2001, there were 239,140 widow(er)s entitled to child-in-care benefits from Social Security. In Table 1, we divide these widow(er)s into three distinct groups: no marriage penalty because of the earnings test, no marriage penalty because of family maximum provisions, and a positive marriage penalty.14 We include summary statistics to relate these groupings to the previous discussion of how marriage penalties arise in the child-in-care program.

Table 1. Widow(er) groups with no actual penalty and with a positive actual penalty, 2001
Group Number Percentage
of all
entitled
Average
annual
earnings
(dollars)
Average
number of
children
Average PIA
of deceased
spouse
(dollars)
No actual penalty
Group A. Earnings test prevents payment of widow(er) benefits for all months in 2001 34,760 14.5 37,696 1.8 870
Group B. Family maximum paid regardless of whether widow(er) remarries 43,230 18.1 3,951 3.0 772
Positive actual penalty
Group C. All with positive actual penalty 161,150 67.4 5,887 1.3 986
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using data from the Social Security Administration's administrative records, 2001.
NOTE: PIA = primary insurance amount.

Note that, for 14.5 percent of widow(er)s (that is, Group A in Table 1), the earnings test prevents the payment of benefits for all months of 2001. For these persons, no widow(er) benefits are paid and there is no actual marriage penalty, and we exclude this group from the remainder of our analysis.15 Some of the widow(er)s in Groups B and C have earnings, but, empirically, the earnings test is of limited importance because the majority (86 percent in Group B and 78 percent in Group C) have earnings below the exempt amount ($10,680).16

For approximately 43,000 widow(er)s (Group B) and their 130,000 children, family benefits will equal the family maximum regardless of remarriage. Recall from the earlier discussion of program rules that these zero-penalty cases occur in all large families (three or more children) and in families with two children and a low PIA. Consistent with this discussion, the average number of children in these families is high (3.0) and the average PIA is low ($772).

Still, the majority of families, 67.4 percent, do face positive marriage penalties. Not surprisingly, in these Group C cases, the average number of children (1.3) is low and the average PIA ($986) is high.

To get a better sense of the distribution of penalties, we use equation 3 to calculate penalties for all widow(er)s in Groups B and C.17 Table 2 shows that 50 percent of widow(er)s face an annual penalty of $4,090 or more. Ten percent of all widow(er)s face an annual marriage penalty in excess of $10,920 per year. Although we do not know whether these penalties are large relative to total income (because Social Security administrative records do not include comprehensive measures of income), over 40 percent of widow(er)s face a penalty equal to 75 percent of the annualized value of their deceased spouses' PIAs. This is presumably a relatively substantial amount given that policymakers believe that 75 percent of PIA is enough to help a widow(er) maintain his or her standard of living following a worker's death.

Table 2. Marriage penalty deciles for all child-in-care widow(er)s receiving benefits, 2001
Decile Annual
dollar
amounts
Annual
relative
amounts
10 0 0
20 0 0
30 1,960 0.19
40 3,580 0.25
50 4,090 0.35
60 5,090 0.75
70 6,820 0.75
80 8,650 0.75
90 10,920 0.75
100 16,150 0.75
Percentage with
zero penalty
21 21
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using data from the Social Security Administration's administrative records, 2001.
NOTES: The dollar penalty measures the annual change in family benefits if the widow(er) were remarried. The annual relative penalty is the ratio of the widow(er)'s annual penalty to 12 times the amount of the deceased worker's primary insurance amount. Widow(er)s who will have all of their benefits suspended in 2001 because of the earnings test are excluded.

Summary statistics for several subgroups of the widowed population are presented in Table 3. Recently entitled widow(er)s—those entitled during 2000—have penalties that are somewhat lower than those for the overall widow(er) group. The mean penalty ($4,230) and the median penalty ($3,910) are $560 and $180 less than the mean and median of the overall widow(er) group. One explanation for this difference is that the entire pool of widow(er)s may disproportionately be persons with high penalties who chose not to remarry precisely because of the penalty. Recently entitled widow(er)s have not had much time to remarry and may reflect a less select distribution.

Table 3. Marriage penalties for child-in-care widow(er)s receiving benefits, by selected characteristics, 2001
  All widow(er)s Recently
entitled
(2000)
Under
age 36
Men
Number 204,380 23,580 44,230 10,850
Penalty
Mean (dollars) 4,790 4,230 3,470 4,040
Median (dollars) 4,090 3,910 3,140 3,770
Percentage with zero penalty 21 26 32 20
Mean PIA (dollars) 941 1,006 841 783
Mean number of children 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.5
SOURCE: Authors' calculations using data from the Social Security Administration's administrative records, 2001.
NOTES: The penalty measures the annual change in family benefits if the widow(er) were remarried. Widow(er)s who will have all of their benefits suspended in 2001 because of the earnings test are excluded.
PIA = primary insurance amount.

Marriage Penalties in the Income Tax Literature

A large literature exists that documents the size of marriage penalties in the U.S. tax code. In addition, several studies within this literature have measured the effect of tax penalties on marriage decisions. In this section, we review the tax literature, compare its findings with results from our work, and discuss its relevance (and limitations) to assessing the effects of Social Security rules on marriage decisions.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Office of Tax Analysis in the Department of Treasury conducted two of the more recent studies on the size of marriage penalties in the U.S. tax code. Using its "Basic Measure," CBO found that 42 percent of married couples in 1996 faced a tax penalty, which had an average annual value of $1,380 (Congressional Budget Office 1997). The Department of Treasury study found that 48 percent of couples incurred a marriage penalty, with an average value in 1999 of $1,141 (Bull and others 1999). These are well below the average penalty reported in Table 3 ($4,790) for all 2001 child-in-care widow(er)s.

Alm and Whittington (1996a) examined marriage tax penalties for the period 1967 through 1994. In constant 1994 dollars, the average penalty rose from about $350 in 1967 to a peak of $1,900 in 1981. Alm and Whittington found that the average penalty in 1994 was $1,200, which is similar to results found by Eissa and Hoynes (2000) and Feenberg and Rosen (1995). Again, these values are well below the average reported in Table 3 for child-in-care widow(er)s.

Studies have found that tax laws have small but statistically significant effects on marital decisions. Alm and Whittington (1995), using time series variation in marriage penalties over the 1947 to 1988 period, found that aggregate marriage rates decline as penalties increase. A follow-up study (Alm and Whittington 1999) that used individual longitudinal data also found a negative relationship between penalties and the probability of marriage. At the mean value of the variables, a 10 percent increase in the marriage penalty lowered the probability of marriage by 2.3 percent; much higher elasticities were found at maximum levels of tax penalties. Other economic variables (for example, the potential additional income provided by a spouse) were also found to be important determinants of marriage.

Alm and Whittington (1999) apply their results to one policy discussion, namely, the federal tax changes of 1993. They cite figures indicating that the marriage penalty of a representative low-income person increased by $465. Their empirical results imply such a change would lower the probability of marriage for low-income persons by about 3 percent.

Some research has focused on whether marriage penalties affect the timing of marriage. Sjoquist and Walker (1995), Gelardi (1996), and Alm and Whittington (1996b) found that couples timed their marriages to avoid paying a tax penalty for 1 year.18 Given that researchers find that marriage penalties in the tax code affect marital decisions and we find the penalties in the child-in-care program are higher than those in the tax code, it is plausible that these penalties discourage some marriages or encourage some couples to postpone marriage while the widow(er) is eligible for benefits.19 Of course, a complete analysis of marriage decisions—which is beyond the scope of this paper—would consider factors in addition to Social Security. For example, some widow(er)s who face marriage penalties under Social Security might actually receive marriage "subsidies" from the income tax system. Alternatively, some widow(er)s may face additional "penalties" if remarriage results in the loss of other federal or state benefits. Further, remarriage decisions are probably correlated with a large number of economic, sociological, and demographic characteristics (such as widow(er)'s age, family size, earnings, and education).

Although we do not conduct a complete analysis of marriage decisions for these widow(er)s, we believe it is a topic that researchers should consider in the future. Economic and demographic studies have found that marriage, in general, is associated with improved health, higher income, and better outcomes for children (Waite 1995). Thus, research on remarriage has the potential to inform policy discussions regarding the well-being of widow(er)s and their children.

Conclusions and Future Research

Although the marriage termination provision in Social Security's child-in-care program helps ensure a well-targeted program, it does produce sizable marriage penalties. These marriage penalties are larger than those that have been documented in the U.S. tax code and, because of their size, probably do affect some marriage decisions. For example, 50 percent of widow(er)s face an annual penalty of $4,090 or more, and 10 percent face an annual marriage penalty in excess of $10,920 per year. Because of larger family sizes and lower PIAs, young widow(er)s tend to face relatively smaller penalties. However, among widow(er)s aged 35 or younger, the median penalty is still substantial ($3,140).

The results in this paper raise a number of additional questions and suggest some important avenues for future research. Because of the family maximum, some widow(er)s do not actually face a marriage penalty (that is, their terminated benefits would be redistributed to their children). Whether these widow(er)s perceive a penalty is unknown—some may not understand that benefits will be redistributed. Future research on how individuals perceive penalties may be warranted. Also, given the size of the penalties (and the results from the income tax literature), it is likely that the termination provision affects some marriage decisions. However, we have not measured the magnitude of this effect, nor have we assessed whether the provision is more likely to cause postponement of marriage (as opposed to never remarrying). The welfare implications in the postponement case are serious (that is, postponing marriage while children are in the household may affect the children's well-being) but are of less concern than in the never-remarrying case (which has implications for the children's well-being and for the widow(er)'s well-being later in life). Measuring the effect of the termination provision is difficult because child-in-care widow(er)s are not typically represented in large numbers in federal surveys (which contain extensive information on financial and personal characteristics). However, future research may be able to combine these widow(er)s with other groups (that face marriage subsidies or penalties) in a general model that relates financial and personal characteristics to marriage decisions.

Notes

1. The AFDC program has been replaced by the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. See Congressional Research Service (2001) for a discussion of TANF provisions relating to marriage.

2. See Moffitt (1998) for a discussion of the AFDC literature and Alm, Dickert-Conlin, and Whittington (1999) for a discussion of the income tax literature. With regard to Social Security, only one other paper has focused on marriage penalties in the Social Security system (Brien, Dickert-Conlin, and Weaver 2001). The authors consider the remarriage penalty facing aged (not child-in-care) widows whose deceased spouses worked in Social Security-covered employment. They find that the 1979 law that reduced the penalty for remarriage over age 60 resulted in more widows aged 60 or older remarrying and that marriage rates among widows drop immediately prior to age 60 and increase at age 60.

3. These statistics are based on weighted samples from administrative records maintained by the Social Security Administration (SSA).

4. The full retirement age of Social Security varies by birth cohort. Two publications by the U.S. Social Security Administration (2001a, 2001b) contain information on this provision and on other program rules.

5. See Leonesio (1993) for a review of the evidence on the incentive effects of the earnings test.

6. As a whole, Social Security probably subsidizes marriage because several types of benefits are based on marriage (U.S. Social Security Administration 2001a).

7. For information on the finances of the overall Social Security system, see Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds (2003).

8. Surviving divorced spouses are also eligible for child-in-care benefits. Throughout the paper, the term widow(er) is meant to include surviving divorced spouses. Also, a child-in-care widow(er) benefit terminates upon remarriage, but it can be restored if the marriage ends.

9. The family maximum formula has a somewhat different structure for years prior to 1979.

10. This result is not specific to the 2001 family maximum formula. Because Social Security annually adjusts each bend point by the same factor, it will always be the case that the family maximum ranges from 150 percent of PIA to about 187.5 percent of PIA.

11. The poverty measure is based on a particular definition of the family: individuals related by blood or marriage who reside in the same household. Our definition of family is based on Social Security program features: individuals who receive benefits on the same deceased worker's record. This definition of family has some advantages. For example, it includes dependent children who do not reside with the widow(er), such as a disabled child in an institution. It also has some drawbacks. Although the widow(er) usually is the mother/father or stepmother/stepfather of the children on the deceased worker's account, this will not always be true.

12. A widow(er) would provide an estimate to SSA of his or her earnings for a particular year. If actual earnings ultimately differed from the reported amount, SSA would pay additional benefits or collect for the overpayment of benefits.

13. The 10 percent sample is based on the last two digits of the widow(er)'s Social Security number (SSN). Each person is assigned a weight of 10. The last two digits of the SSN can be used to form a random sample (the two digits are not systematically assigned), and such samples are used for SSA publications, such as the Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin (U.S. Social Security Administration 2001a). Our data, which are not publicly available due to confidentiality restrictions, include information from SSA's benefit records, earnings records, and SSN application records.

14. We project 2001 earnings on the basis of actual earnings from 1999. Specifically, we assume 2001 earnings will be 11 percent higher than 1999 earnings. Average wages in the United States grew by 11 percent from 1997 to 1999 (U.S. Social Security Administration 2001a, Table 2.A8).

15. A similar group that is excluded is composed of widow(er)s whose earnings were so high that they did not bother to file for benefits (note that this "no filing" group is not listed in Table 1). Such persons do not receive benefits and, consequently, do not face marriage penalties.

16. By definition, no widow(er) in group B or C has all 12 months of benefits suspended because of the earnings test. For the relatively few persons in these groups with earnings above the exempt amount, 1 or more months of benefits (but fewer than 12) will be suspended. For these widow(er)s, we calculate penalties as explained in the discussion of the earnings test.

17. Equation 3 pertains to monthly marriage penalties. Except when the earnings test would prevent payment of benefits for some months of the year, we approximate annual penalties by multiplying the monthly penalty as of January 2001 by 12.

18. For a study that examines how marriage penalties are affected by the interaction between the tax system and government transfer programs, see Dickert-Conlin and Houser (1998).

19. Studies from the income tax literature are not restricted to families with minor or disabled children, so results may not directly apply to child-in-care widow(er)s. However, we also note that the AFDC literature has found marriage effects (Moffitt 1998).

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