Acquiescence Ruling 00-4(2): Rescinded 9/25/2003 by 68 FR 51317
EFFECTIVE/PUBLICATION DATE: 9/11/2000
Whether we have the burden of proving residual functional capacity (RFC) at step five of the sequential evaluation process for determining disability in 20 CFR 404.1520 and 416.920.
Sections 205(a), 223(d)(2)(A), 223(d)(5), 702(a)(5), 1614(a)(3)(B), 1614(a)(3)(H) and 1631(d)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(a), 423(d)(2)(A), 423(d)(5), 902(a)(5), 1382c(a)(3)(B), 1382c(a)(3)(H) and 1383(d)(1)) and;
20 CFR 404.1512, 404.1520, 404.1527, 404.1545, 404.1546, 416.912, 416.920, 416.927, 416.945, 416.946,
Social Security Rulings 96-5p and 96-8p.
Second (Connecticut, New York and Vermont).
Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2000).
This Ruling applies to all determinations or decisions at all administrative levels (i.e., initial, reconsideration, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearing, and Appeals Council).
Cordie Curry injured his back and right knee on September 30, 1987, when he jumped or fell from a ladder to avoid hot water flowing from a pipe. Mr. Curry was referred to an orthopedic surgeon for lower back pain, and received physical therapy from January 14, 1988, through June 28, 1988. The orthopedic surgeon performed surgery on Mr. Curry's knee on July 13, 1988, and diagnosed an internal derangement. In February and March 1995, Mr. Curry again saw the orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed osteoarthritis in both knees and completed a "medical assessment" form. This treating physician concluded that Mr. Curry could sit for 2 hours continuously, stand for 30 minutes at a time and walk for 15 minutes at a time. In his physician's opinion, during the course of an 8-hour day, Mr. Curry could sit for no more than 2-3 hours, stand for a total of 1 hour and walk a total of 30 minutes. The treating physician also provided an opinion that Mr. Curry could occasionally lift up to 20 pounds and occasionally carry up to 10 pounds.
On September 28, 1993, Mr. Curry filed an application for disability benefits claiming an inability to work since October 9, 1990. In connection with this application, Mr. Curry was examined on January 24, 1994, by a consulting physician who reported that an X-ray of the knee showed mild degenerative joint disease. The consulting physician concluded that Mr. Curry had "moderate" impairment of lifting and carrying activities, and "mild" impairment in standing and walking, pushing and pulling, and sitting.
After a hearing, an ALJ decided that Mr. Curry was not disabled based on a finding that he retained the RFC to perform the exertional requirements of at least sedentary work. The ALJ found that Mr. Curry's impairments prevented him from performing his past relevant work, but that "the record [did] not establish that [he was] unable to sit for prolonged periods of time, lift and carry ten pounds and perform the minimal standing and walking required for sedentary work activity."
After the Appeals Council denied Mr. Curry's request for review, he sought judicial review. The district court held that our final decision was supported by substantial evidence. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court reversed and remanded the case for calculation of disability benefits.
The Second Circuit held that we have the burden of proving at step five of the sequential evaluation process that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work which exists in the national economy. The court found that, in this case, the ALJ's conclusions about RFC evidenced a disregard for this procedure.
Under sections 205(a), 223(d)(5), 1614(a)(3) and 1631(d)(1) of the Act, and 20 CFR 404.1512 and 416.912 of our regulations, the claimant generally bears the burden of proving disability by furnishing medical and other evidence we can use to reach conclusions about his or her impairment(s), and its effect on his or her ability to work on a sustained basis. Our responsibility is to make every reasonable effort to develop a claimant's complete medical history including to arrange for consultative examinations, if necessary.
There is a shift in the burden of proof, "only if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to the fifth step * * *. It is not unreasonable to require the claimant, who is in a better position to provide information about his own medical condition, to do so." Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n5 (1987). However, once a claimant establishes that he or she is unable to do past relevant work, it would be unreasonable to further require him or her to produce vocational evidence showing that there are no jobs in the national economy that a person with his or her RFC can perform. Accordingly, the only burden shift that occurs at step five is that we are required to prove that there is other work that the claimant can perform, given his or her RFC.
Therefore, under our interpretation of our regulations, we do not have the burden at step five (or step four) to prove what the claimant's RFC is. We assess RFC one time, after concluding that a claimant's impairment(s) is "severe" but does not meet or equal a listing in the Listing of Impairments in appendix 1 of subpart P of 20 CFR part 404. Although we use this assessment at steps four and five of the sequential evaluation process, we make the assessment at a step in the process at which the claimant is responsible for proving disability.
The Second Circuit has expanded our burden of proof at step five beyond the issue of work which exists in significant numbers to the assessment of RFC. The Second Circuit held that, in determining disability at step five, we have the burden of proving that a claimant retains the RFC to perform other work.
This Ruling applies only to claims in which the claimant resides in Connecticut, New York, or Vermont at the time of the determination or decision at any level of administrative review; i.e., initial, reconsideration, ALJ hearing, or Appeals Council review.
In making a disability determination or decision at step five of the sequential evaluation process, we have the burden of proving with sufficient evidence that a claimant can perform the requirements of other work. To meet this burden, we will assess RFC by evaluating all of the relevant evidence in the case record about a claimant's impairment(s) according to our rules for assessing RFC, and will in our determinations and decisions or in the case record certify that there is sufficient evidence to support our findings regarding RFC at step five, and refer to the relevant evidence or the explanation (e.g., the RFC assessment form) in which the relevant evidence is cited.
We will apply this Social Security Acquiescence Ruling to current and reopened claims governed by the court-approved settlement in Stieberger v. Sullivan, 801 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), but not to the extent it is inconsistent with that settlement.
We intend to clarify our regulations regarding a claimant's burden to provide evidence of RFC, and we may rescind this Ruling once we have made the clarification.
 Although Curry was a title II case, similar principles also apply to title XVI. Therefore, this Ruling applies to both title II and title XVI disability claims.
 We deleted the term "medical assessment" from 20 CFR 404.1513 and 416.913 on August 1, 1991, and replaced it with the terms "statement about what you can still do despite your impairment(s)" and "medical source statement." See 56 FR 36932.
 In a second "medical assessment" form, another treating physician, Dr. Hussapibis, concurred with Dr. Hobeika's opinion.
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